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 Resolving the Ineff ability Paradox 
 Chien-hsing  Ho 
 I 
 If I believe that a certain item X is ineff able for the reason that X cannot be expressed 
as it truly is by human concepts and words, questions arise as to how I can make this 
known to others  in words , how words can be used to gesture toward X. I cannot even 
say X is unsayable, 1 because in  saying so, I would have made X  sayable . Th is is a time-
honored conundrum known to many philosophers and religious thinkers in the East 
and the West. Confronting this conundrum, Augustine thinks it is better to evade the 
concerned verbal confl ict silently than to quell it disputatiously, and early Wittgenstein 
famously asks us to pass over the ineff able in silence. 
 Indeed, a number of contemporary philosophers would agree that the unqualifi ed 
statement  “ X is unspeakable ” faces the danger of self-referential absurdity: if this 
statement is true, it must at the same time be false, given that X is speakable by the 
predicate word  “ unspeakable. ” 2 Th is predicament can be formulated as the following 
argument, which I shall term the  “ ineff ability paradox ” : 
 P1: X is unspeakable. 
 P2: Th e statement  “ X is unspeakable ” is true. (From P1) 
 P3: X is speakable by the predicate word  “ unspeakable. ” (From P2) 
 P4: Th e statement  “ X is unspeakable ” is not true. (From P3) 
  ∴ Th e statement  “ X is unspeakable ” is both true and not true. (From P2 and P4) 
 Palpably, the conclusion of this argument is a contradiction. Recently, Graham 
Priest has reiterated that speaking of the ineff able does involve a real contradiction. 
However, his strategy for tackling something like the ineff ability paradox, besides 
using the techniques of contemporary paraconsistent logic, is to aver that some 
contradictions are true in that they have their cause in the nature of reality, a nature 
that is contradictory. Th ere are then, for Priest, contradictory statements that are 
true, and the statement  “ X is unspeakable ” can well be both true and contradictory. 3 
Nevertheless, most of us would fi nd it hard to swallow the idea of the contradictoriness 
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 Aft er the linguistic turn in the early twentieth century, with so much emphasis 
placed on the ubiquity and signifi cance of language, the notion of ineff ability may, 
for many philosophers, become somewhat obsolescent, perhaps something to be left  
to mystics and old school metaphysicians. Th en, why do we need to bother with the 
notion? With all due respect to language, however, we must not think that language 
knows no limits, as we must not think we can capture the fresh gust of present actuality 
in the box of past convention. It is  not true that each and every aspect of reality is 
speakable in the sense of being directly and properly expressible in words. If so, the 
notion of ineff ability can still be of relevance to contemporary philosophizing. 
 To explain — in its use of general terms, such as  “ tree ” and  “ squirrel, ” language 
operates in the realms of resemblance or commonness. It relies for its operation on the 
application of a general term to many particular objects that are held to be subsumed 
under the concept that corresponds to that term. For example, the word  “ tree ” can 
be used, on the grounds of diff erent trees ’ resemblance to one another, to refer to any 
one tree or all trees. Yet, features that are really specifi c to a particular tree  qua tree do 
not fall within the semantic range of the word. It helps little to appeal to more specifi c 
words such as  “ maple ” or  “ sugar maple, ” because they, as general terms, also function 
on the grounds of resemblance. Th us, such features can be so concrete, specifi c, and 
fi ne-grained that the tree evades complete linguistic determination, which must be 
abstract, generic, and coarse-grained. Given that words do not match the features, the 
tree is ineff able in at least some of its aspects. 4 
 Furthermore, if one ’ s repertoire of realities does not include universals and 
resemblances (more or less generic features that may be believed by others to inhere 
in things of the world), then concrete particulars such as maples and apples are 
wholly ineff able insofar as they are taken to be devoid of objective universals and real 
resemblances. Dign ā ga (c. 480 – 540 CE), a prominent Indian Buddhist epistemologist, 
basically takes such a stance. 5 For him, universals and resemblances are conceptually 
constructed and imposed onto real particulars, which are, in themselves, beyond the 
grip of words and concepts. Th e point for us is that the notion of ineff ability may even 
concern objects of sense perception. 
 Now, if concrete particulars are ineff able, how are we to use words to refer to them? 
In the fi ft h chapter of his magnum opus, the  Pram ā ṇ asamuccaya , Dign ā ga puts forth 
a semantic theory of meaning known as the  apoha (exclusion) theory, according to 
which a nominal word functions by excluding objects other than its own referent. Th e 
meaning of the word  “ maple ” would then be the exclusion of non-maples. Dign ā ga 
does not explicitly address the aforesaid conundrum. However, the Chinese Yog ā c ā ra 
thinker Kuiji ( 窺 基 , 632 – 682) applies the theory to tackle the conundrum. As a fi rst 
step toward resolving the ineff ability paradox, I shall in the next (second) section 
discuss Dign ā ga ’ s and Kuiji ’ s relevant views on the issue. 
 In section 3, I fi rst cope with the predicament of setting a limit to language. Th en, 
I attend to a few passages in the works of the two Chinese M ā dhyamika philosophers, 
Sengzhao ( 僧 肇 , 374? – 414) and Jizang ( 吉 藏 , 549 – 623), and of the fi ft h-century 
Hindu grammarian-philosopher Bhart ṛ hari to reconstruct a strategy for showing 
how we can gesture toward the ineff able without making contradictions. A key 
notion here is that of  indication as an indirect mode of expression, the mechanism 
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and functioning of which will be clarifi ed. In section 4, I contrast indication with 
description while introducing the notion of correctness in order to resolve the 
ineff ability paradox. Th ereaft er, I discuss and dismiss three other approaches for 
tackling the conundrum as well as two likely objections against my strategy. Section 5 
presents the conclusion. 
 II 
 Indian philosophers generally think that to apply a nominal word properly to a thing, 
a basis for the application is needed, that when one cognizes in a thing the basis for 
the application of a word, one is justifi ed in using the word to refer to that thing. 
A universal inherent in a thing would for many serve as the basis: when I cognize in a 
tree the universal mapleness, I am justifi ed in applying the word  “ maple ” to that tree. 
Alternatively, some may hold that things of the same kind bear a family resemblance 
between them, which can well serve as the basis. 
 Dign ā ga repudiates the reality of universals and resemblances. 6 Instead, he brings 
in  apoha or exclusion of others as a substitute for universals. Th e exclusion is only 
a conceptual-semantic item, to be reckoned with whenever we use words, but in no 
way truly inherent in a particular. Presumably, for him, the basis for the application 
of the word  “ maple ” to particular maples is not the universal mapleness, but the 
exclusion of things other than maples, in short, non-maples, such as pines, breadfruits, 
rabbits, squirrels, hills, rivers, and so forth. Th e exclusion of non-maples is what all 
the particular maples have in common, on the basis of which one can use the word to 
refer to them. Incidentally, we can also use the term  apoha operationally by saying that 
the word  “ maple ” functions by excluding non-maples or by diff erentiating the maples 
from other things. 
 For Dign ā ga, a nominal word directly and properly expresses exclusion of others 
 qua its basis of application. However, he also takes the word to directly and properly 
express something else. To cite two relevant statements 7 : 
 S1: A word says ( ā ha ) those things that are qualifi ed by exclusion of others. 
 S2: Th e word  “ tree ” . . . presents its own object ( sv ā rtha ) as possessing the feature 
of being a tree. Th us, the object of a word is a thing qualifi ed by exclusion, but not 
merely exclusion. 
 Th e word  “ tree ” conventionally expresses and refers to all particular trees; it may, 
given contextual factors, be used to refer to a given tree. One may take S1 to mean 
that the word  says (viz., directly and properly expresses) particular trees by excluding 
non-trees. However, on account of the ineff ability of particulars, the word cannot 
really say any particular tree or any of the latter ’ s intrinsic features. In addition, the 
qualifi er-qualifi cand distinction is for Dign ā ga conceptually constructed. Th us, a 
conceptually unqualifi ed particular tree must be distinguished from the tree qualifi ed 
by the exclusion of non-trees. Meanwhile, the own object of the word, as noted in 
S2, is a thing qualifi ed by the exclusion of non-trees. Th e exclusion is conventionally 
none other than the generic feature of being a tree, which the thing is linguistically 
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presented as possessing. In any case, the word  “ tree ” directly and properly expresses a 
conceptually qualifi ed, generic tree as well as the exclusion of non-trees. 
 As such a qualifi ed generic something is what a word  semantically refers to, it may 
be termed the  “ semantic referent. ” In contrast, the real particular concerned may be 
termed the  “ intended referent, ” because it is what the language user intends to refer to 
but has diffi  culty putting into words. Of course, under normal circumstances, no one 
would use the word  “ maple ” to refer to a conceptual-semantic item as the semantic 
referent. Given the ineff ability of a particular maple  qua the intended referent, 
however, we need to reckon with a generic maple as an individual thing taken precisely 
as conceptually qualifi ed by the exclusion of non-maples. 
 Intriguingly, before the time of Dign ā ga, ideas similar to the notion of  apoha 
were present in Chinese Madhyamaka. Sengzhao asserts that, in Mahayana Buddhist 
scriptures, the use of the word  “ existent ” ( you  有 ) with respect to a thing is to show 
that the thing is  not nonexistent, whereas that of the word  “ nonexistent ” ( wu  無 ) is to 
make explicit that the thing is  not existent. 8 Th e words function by diff erentiating their 
referents from what the referents are not, rather than denoting something defi nitively 
existent or nonexistent. However, the rationale behind the assertion diff ers from 
Dign ā ga ’ s. It concerns Sengzhao ’ s own M ā dhyamika view, which he thinks is implied 
in the scriptures, that the myriad things are  empty in the sense of being void of any 
determinate form or nature. 
 Although the  apoha theory was set forth to explain how nominal words function 
given the ineff ability of particulars, Dign ā ga did not explicitly address the conundrum 
of saying the unsayable. Yet, the Chinese Yog ā c ā ra thinker Kuiji does apply the theory 
to off er a noteworthy solution 9 : 
 A particular cannot be reached by word and speech. . . . [Question:] If so, all real 
things being unspeakable, wouldn ’ t it be inappropriate as well to speak the word 
 “ unspeakable ” ? [Answer:] Th e word is spoken in order to exclude the speakables. 
It is not meant that the word  “ unspeakable ” matches the substances of things 
( fati  法 體 ), for the latter are not [what one would take to be by the concept of] 
 unspeakable . 
 Th e question posed is that if one uses the word  “ unspeakable ” to  speak of particulars 
as unspeakable, one would self-contradictorily make them speakable. To resolve the 
problem, Kuiji applies the  apoha operation to the word  “ unspeakable. ” Th e word here 
does not really  reach or speak of the unspeakable; it does not predicate of the latter 
the intrinsic property of being unspeakable. Instead, the word functions by excluding 
speakable items such as unreal universals. Meanwhile, Kuiji implies that we must 
distinguish between an unspeakable thing in itself and what we understand it to be by 
the concept of  “ unspeakable, ” a distinction that corresponds to that between intended 
referent and semantic referent. 
 Kuiji ’ s ingenious solution is helpful, but it does not explain how words used can 
refer, or direct one ’ s attention, to the ineff able. 10 Elsewhere, he claims that nominal 
words both exclude and signify. 11 We may clarify this terse claim by considering 
the view of his pupil Huizhao ( 惠 沼 , 650 – 714), who appears to think something 
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like this: as the word, say,  “ maple ” was formed and learned by people ’ s perceiving 
particular maples in the past, although it mainly excludes non-maples, one can use 
it provisionally to refer to what one intends to signify, namely, particular maples. 12 
Presumably, both convention and causation play a role here. Still, this view does not 
explain the mechanism of linguistic reference, so it is far from being satisfactory. 
 III 
 In the preface to his  Tractatus , Wittgenstein writes thus:  “ In order to be able to draw 
a limit to thought, we should have to fi nd both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e., we 
should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). ” 13 Similarly, it may be said, 
to set a limit to language, we should have to fi nd both sides of the limit sayable and so 
the unsayable would turn out to be sayable. We can understand this by considering an 
analogical example in actual life. In order to draw a line as a limit on any surface, our 
eyes would have to look at both sides of the line. Th en, the two sides of the line are on 
a par, equally visible or cognizable to us; in  this sense, the limit ceases to be a limit. 
However, there is a line or limit that is an exception to this: the horizon. 
 Suppose, on a countryside, someone asks me about the location of village X, which 
is somewhere beyond our visible horizon. Although I can  point out the roads to X, 
which we both can see, I can only  point toward X, of which neither of us can have a 
glimpse, while saying something like  “ It is over there above the horizon. ” Clearly, X 
and the roads to X, on the two sides of the horizon, are not equally cognized. Still, with 
the information conveyed, the person can roughly locate X and know how to reach it. 
Likewise, things on the near side of our  semantic horizon (the limits to sayability) can 
be spoken of or described, whereas those on the far side can only be gestured toward 
or indicated. Th e sayable and the unsayable, on the two sides of the horizon, are surely 
diff erent. Even though words cannot describe the unsayable, they can gesture toward 
it, locating it on the far side of a segment of the semantic horizon. 
 Gesturing toward is an indirect mode of expression, and so I am assuming that 
the ineff able is indirectly expressible. As far as I can tell, when an Eastern ineff abilist 
asserts that a certain item X is ineff able, he or she is mostly denying any conformity 
between words and X, but not X ’ s indirect expressibility too. In this regard, we may 
attend to Sengzhao again 14 : 
 As this [sagely mind] is nameless, it cannot be spoken of in words. Yet, though it 
cannot be spoken of in words, it cannot be transmitted without the use of words. 
Th us, the sages speak all day without having spoken. 
 Sengzhao clearly implies that though sagely mind is unspeakable, it is linguistically 
transmittable. Words can be used to transmit information about the mind and thereby 
indirectly express it. Meanwhile, the paradoxical expression  “ the sages speak all day 
without having spoken ” presumably means that the sages do not use words to  speak the 
unspeakable. Th e words used are provisional, 15 indirectly expressive, and to be negated 
if one takes them to represent the unspeakable as it is. 
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 Elsewhere, Sengzhao explains why anything is said to be ineff able 16 : 
 A speech arises from names, names arise because of forms ( xiang  相 ), and a form 
arises owing to the mind ’ s cognizing a form [in its object]. What is formless is 
nameless, what is nameless is speechless. 
 Th e term  “ form ” is related to the Indian notion of the basis for the application of a 
word. If one conceptually cognizes a generic or coarse-grained form in an object, one 
can adequately apply the corresponding word to the object, and the object is deemed 
sayable. However, if the object is not endowed with any such cognizable form, as sagely 
mind is for Sengzhao, then, being formless, it is nameless and unsayable. 
 Now, if X is formless and unsayable, how can we use words to refer to it? Sengzhao 
suggests that words used to identify the unsayable are provisional external appellations. 
According to Jizang, all the Buddha ’ s teachings  “ are similar in trying provisionally to 
apply names and forms to that which is nameless and formless, in order that sentient 
beings realize the speechless by means of speech. ” 17 Th en, to let others understand the 
formless and unsayable X, we should provisionally apply the word  “ unsayable ” to it. 
For this provisional application, a provisional form as the basis is needed. Th e form 
can be the state of being unsayable, or simply unsayability, which is what the word 
directly and properly expresses. Although X is formless, we can conceive this form of 
unsayability and apply or superimpose it onto X such that one understands that X is 
unsayable. 
 Something like this can be rationally reconstructed from the following passage 
by the Hindu grammarian-philosopher Bhart ṛ hari in his attempt to resolve the 
conundrum of saying the unsayable 18 : 
 If a thing is said to be unsayable, someway or another or in all ways, by some 
words, then its state of being unsayable [i.e., its unsayability] is  not denied by those 
words. Indeed, a doubt with regard to an object does not function toward the 
dubiousness attached [to that object] without giving up its own nature. 
 Suppose for some reason I am doubting someone, I do not simultaneously doubt her 
dubiousness. If, instead, I come to doubt her dubiousness, then she is made free from 
doubt and my doubt gives up its original nature of rendering her dubious. Likewise, 
we can thus construe the functioning of the word  “ unsayable ” in the statement  “ X 
is unsayable. ” Th e word  denies only X itself, but not X ’ s unsayability; that is, the 
word conveys that X is  not sayable, but not that X ’ s unsayability is not sayable. To 
put it the other way, the word  says only X ’ s unsayability, but not X itself. Signifi cantly, 
this unsayability is not an intrinsic feature or property of X. It is only provisionally 
conceived and does not really inhere in X. Yet, by being superimposed on X, it makes 
known that X is unsayable. As X is  not said, it is not made sayable. As the unsayability 
is said, by being superimposed on X, one comprehends the unsayability  of X. Th us, the 
purpose of making known that X is unsayable is achieved, without thereby making X 
sayable. 
 Th e notion of superimposition plays a key role here as it helps to relate that which 
is said to what is unsayable and show how words can be used to direct one ’ s attention 
to the unsayable. On the one hand, the superimposition has the function of revealing, 
Comparative Philosophy without Borders.indb   74 6/30/2015   11:23:13 AM
Resolving the Ineff ability Paradox 75
because the superimposed unsayability shows X to be unsayable. It performs the 
function of concealing on the other, for it covers up the real nature of X, which is  not 
unsayable in the way we understand X through the concept of unsayability (recall the 
above quotation from Kuiji). Th en, we need to negate the superimposition, taking it 
as simply a provisional application, not a real attribution. In the provisional use of 
the word  “ unsayable, ” we cognize the unsayable through the superimposition on it of 
unsayability and the negation of this superimposition. Without the superimposition 
nothing about the unsayable would be intimated; without the negation the unsayable 
may erroneously become sayable. 19 
 Let us use the term  “ indicate ” in this technical sense: the word  “ unsayable ”  says the 
form of unsayability and so, with the unsayability being superimposed on X,  indicates 
X such that one comprehends that X is unsayable. Hence, indication is an indirect 
mode of expression that consists of two phases: the saying phase and the imposition 
phase. An indicative expression can indirectly express the unsayable without actually 
saying it. 
 In respect of the word  “ unsayable, ” we have so far focused on the form of unsayability. 
Yet, our discussions on Dign ā ga ’ s  apoha theory suggest that the word also directly and 
properly expresses a generic something qualifi ed by the unsayability. It is a qualifi ed 
generic X  qua the word ’ s semantic referent. Th e semantic referent is then superimposed 
on the unsayable X  qua the intended referent such that one knows X to be  something 
unsayable. However, we can generally neglect this aspect of the functioning of a word. 
In addition, while we have been mainly concerned with a word in the context of a 
sentence, the mechanism of indication can,  mutatis mutandis , be applied to a sentence 
as well, allowing us to speak of an indicative sentence or statement. 
 Finally, indication can broadly be regarded as a gestural language. It helps to 
reconstrue, and is reinforced by, the horizon simile. Here, my pointing gesture, as it 
were,  tells the direction for reaching village X. Th is direction is superimposed onto 
what lies beyond a segment of the horizon, the result of which is the rough location of 
the village. Th e location may need implicitly to be negated as it is not truly an intrinsic 
feature of the village. In any case, the point for us is that we can gesture toward the 
ineff able without making contradictions. 
 IV 
 It is widely thought in contemporary philosophy that human language has both 
cognitive (referential) and noncognitive (nonreferential) functions. In its cognitive 
function, language is meant primarily to convey information about, or express factual 
descriptions of, the world. In its noncognitive function, language is used not primarily 
to convey information but to make a request, give an order, elicit feelings, evoke 
experiences, and so forth. Yet, I think it is unconvincing to hold that language has 
only one cognitive function, that is, to describe objects or states of aff airs. Suppose 
X is unspeakable and the statement  “ X is unspeakable ” truly describes what the case 
is, namely, the state of aff airs of X ’ s being unspeakable. Th en, as X can be spoken of by 
the statement, the statement is both true and not true. Th e ineff ability paradox ensues! 
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 Indication as an indirect mode of expression is broadly cognitive in that it conveys 
information about its intended referent. Unlike a description, however, an indication 
is not meant to, and does not actually, match the referent. Since the notion of truth is 
oft en understood to imply a correspondence between language (words, propositions) 
and reality (objects, states of aff airs), we should not take an indicative sentence to 
be a truth-bearer: it is  not either true or false. However, not only can an indication 
meaningfully, informatively gesture toward something beyond our semantic horizon, 
but the information transmitted can be correct or otherwise (In showing where 
village X is, my pointing would be correct if I point in the right direction, incorrect if 
otherwise.). Th erefore, I suggest that we, instead, speak of an indication as correct or 
incorrect, where the notion of correctness does not imply the aforesaid correspondence. 
 Now, recall the argument I termed the ineff ability paradox. Th e argument embodies 
a legitimate logical paradox if we treat its premises as descriptive statements, which 
are all plausibly true. However, if we treat P1,  “ X is unspeakable, ” as an indicative 
statement, then, even if the statement  “ X is unspeakable ” is correct, it is not true that 
the statement is true. Th erefore, P2 is false. Consequently, the argument turns out to 
be fallacious and fails to be a legitimate paradox. We have thus resolved the ineff ability 
paradox. Th e point, then, depends on whether we use the words of the statement 
indicatively or descriptively. 
 Th ere are, of course, other possible ways of responding to the conundrum of saying 
the unsayable or the ineff ability paradox. To keep this chapter focused, I shall briefl y 
discuss only three approaches that are pertinent here. Th e fi rst approach distinguishes 
fi rst-order from second-order use of words and treats the word  “ unspeakable ” in the 
above statement as a second-order word that refers to fi rst-order words. For instance, 
two verses aft er the above-quoted passage Bhart ṛ hari writes:  “ What functions as 
a signifi er cannot be signifi ed. Th at which expresses something else cannot in the 
same context be expressed. ” 20 Th us, the word  “ unspeakable ” functions to convey that 
X cannot be spoken of by any fi rst-order words, the word not being one of them. It 
is a mistake, and goes against the language user ’ s intention, to assert that the use of 
the word in respect of X would result in self-referential absurdity. Meanwhile, in the 
paradox argument, the statement  “ X is unspeakable ” ought to be qualifi ed one way in 
P2, another way in P4; when this is done, the argument is fallacious and the paradox 
ceases to arise. One problem with this approach is that it implies that X can be spoken 
of by the word  “ unspeakable. ” 21 Th is is a bit odd, and anyone who adopts the approach 
owes us an explanation as to why and  how X is speakable by second-order words but 
unspeakable by fi rst-order words (when both are human words). 
 For similar purposes, the anonymous Chinese Buddhist text  Awakening of the 
Mahayana Faith ( Dacheng qishen lun ,  大 乘 起 信 論 ) introduces the phrase  “ using words 
to exclude words ” ( yin yan qian yan ,  因 言 遣 言 ) to contend that the term  “ suchness ” 
( zhenru ,  真 如 ) is the ultimate term that one can appeal to for intimating the ineff able 
mind of suchness, and that the term serves the function of excluding all other terms. 
Unlike the former approach, however, even the term  “ suchness, ” the text suggests, is 
provisional and does not match the ineff able. Th e commentator and Huayan master 
Fazang ( 法 藏 , 643 – 712) gives an intriguing analogy. One shouts  “ Quiet! ” in order to 
stop human noises. Without the shouting, the noises would not be stopped. Yet, if one, 
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to make sure that the order is obeyed, shouts several times, then one makes noises 
oneself and fails to stop noises. Just as here one must not keep shouting, likewise, 
the term  “ suchness ” needs to be excluded too. 22 Th is points to the second approach 
concerned, in which one negates or  unsays whatever one has said about the ineff able. 
Of the paradox argument, one who upholds the approach can challenge even P1 by 
saying something like  “ I don ’ t mean to say X is unspeakable ” or  “ X ’ s being unspeakable 
is also unspeakable. ” 
 We already touched on this approach while explaining Sengzhao ’ s expression  “ the 
sages speak all day without having spoken. ” It is partially implicit in the discussion on 
the notion of superimposition. Like Kuiji ’ s ingenious  apoha solution, the approach has 
the advantage of refraining from making the unsayable sayable. Nonetheless, they are 
both defi cient because they do not clearly explain how words can, one way or another, 
be related to the unsayable: without the relation, the words used are hardly better than 
meaningless sounds. By contrast, our strategy overcomes this problem by resorting to 
the notions of superimposition and of gesturing beyond the horizon. 
 Th e third approach, the  dialetheist approach, radically diff ers from the fi rst two. 
In their paper on contradictions in Buddhism, Graham Priest, Jay Garfi eld, and 
Yasuo Deguchi contend that certain Mahayana Buddhists are committed to the view 
that some contradictions are true and acceptable, and that modern developments in 
paraconsistent logics have shown that such a stance can be rational. According to them, 
for instance, some Buddhists describe certain things about an indescribable reality 
such that the indescribable is described. 23 Th en, the paradox argument would have the 
conclusion that the statement  “ X is unspeakable ” is both true and contradictory, which 
they would say is rationally acceptable. 
 If the Buddhist simply means to transmit indirectly certain information about an 
indescribable reality, then, as we have seen, to state that the reality is indescribable is 
 not to describe it. Th ere is no irresoluble contradiction here. It is, instead, gesturing 
beyond our semantic horizon by telling something about the direction across the 
horizon. To the best of my knowledge, Mahayana Buddhist thinkers never explicitly 
assert that some contradictions are true. Whereas some Buddhists are keen on 
using paradoxical or fi gurative expressions, this usually has to do with the perceived 
limitations of descriptive language. As an additional note, Priest ’ s claim that reality is 
contradictory in the sense that it is such as to render certain contradictory statements 
true squares poorly with the Chinese M ā dhyamika position that reality is  empty of any 
describable determinate structure. 24 A contradiction is as determinate as a tautology. 
Correspondingly, to claim that reality is contradictory is to predicate of reality a 
determinate, though contradictory, structure describable in words or logical symbols. 
Yet, what if reality is indescribable and, somewhat like an amorphous lump, empty of 
any determinate structure? Perhaps, the idea of a contradictory reality fi ts better with a 
logically possible world, but not the concrete world of lived experience. 
 To complete this section, let me examine two likely objections against my strategy. 
First, some may object that I, like many others, have unnecessarily complicated the 
issue of referring to the ineff able. Aft er all, one can use nominal words simply as proper 
names that designate and refer to the ineff able. Since few would take a proper name 
to have any conceptual meaning or content, the use of such names would not result 
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in the aforesaid conundrum. Second, it may be charged that my strategy is based on 
the problematic assumption that the ineff able is indirectly expressible. In actual fact, 
the objector may say, some ineff abilists claim or imply that the ineff able is indirectly 
inexpressible as well. Th us, even if we rephrase P2 of the paradox argument as  “ Th e 
statement  ‘ X is unspeakable ’ is correct ” (where the word  “ unspeakable ” implies indirect 
inexpressibility), the argument would still have the contradictory conclusion to the 
eff ect that the statement is both correct and not correct. Th en, the strategy fails to 
resolve the ineff ability paradox. 
 In responding to the fi rst objection, we may appeal to William Alston ’ s views against 
a tactic for resolving the predicament of referring to the ineff able. For Alston, although 
the word  “ God ” in the statement  “ God is ineff able ” may be regarded as a proper 
name not standing for any concept, we would not count anyone as understanding the 
statement if he or she is unable to use some identifying phrase, for example  “ the fi rst 
cause ” or  “ the father of Jesus Christ, ” to explain the word. Yet, any such phrase would 
constitute a characterization of God and so make God factually speakable. 25 Th e use or 
understanding of a proper name thus presupposes a certain expressible knowledge of 
the object named, but this inevitably implies the expression of the so-called ineff able. In 
addition, we also wonder how anyone can use the word  “ unspeakable ” in the statement 
 “ X is unspeakable ” as a proper name at all. Hence, the issue cannot be resolved so easily 
as is believed by the objector. 
 I agree with the second objection that if the ineff able X is directly and indirectly 
inexpressible, then one cannot express it without making contradictions. When asked 
any question about X, the ineff abilist cannot but remain in silence. To make matters 
worse, if remaining in silence counts as a body language, which in turn counts as a 
form of language, then one cannot even stay silent. 26 Th ere would be no escape from 
self-contradiction. Nonetheless, it is never my intention to defend such an ineff abilist. 
In addition, to my knowledge, no Eastern ineff abilist referred to above asserts that 
his ineff able X is indirectly inexpressible. Consequently, our assumption is not 
problematic, and the objection may simply miss its target. 
 V 
 We began this chapter with the time-honored linguistic-philosophical conundrum 
of saying the unsayable and the related ineff ability paradox. For many, this issue is 
unresolvable, which casts doubts on the viability of the notion of ineff ability. Aft er 
examining the Buddhist semantic theory of  apoha and an  apoha solution to the issue, 
we resorted to certain Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical materials to rationally 
reconstruct a strategy for coping with the conundrum and, especially, resolving the 
paradox. By introducing the mode of expression termed  “ indication, ” together with 
the relevant notions of superimposition and of gesturing beyond the horizon, I wish 
to have shown that expressing the ineff able does not necessarily involve irresoluble 
contradiction. It is also hoped that our philosophical exercise, unusual in conjoining 
Chinese Buddhism and Hindu philosophy, points to a constructive way forward for 
comparative philosophy. 
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 If our strategy is on the whole persuasive, if we cannot adequately capture the fresh 
gust of actuality in the box of convention, then philosophers may need to recognize 
the limitations of language and acknowledge the relevance of the notion of ineff ability 
for contemporary philosophizing. Instead of belittling language, this recognition may 
induce one to value even more various possibly non-descriptive modes of expression 
such as metaphor, negation, paradox, indication, parable, poetic language, and so 
on. It might also prompt philosophers to attend more than is normal to the concrete, 
fi ne-grained, and tacit aspects of human life and experience, which have tended to be 
fi ltered out by abstract philosophical thinking. 
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V ā kyapad ī ya, pp. 123, 132. 
 19 For a related paper of mine that focuses on Bhart ṛ hari ’ s approach, see: Chien-hsing 
Ho,  “ Saying the Unsayable, ”  Philosophy East and West 56, no. 3 (2006), pp. 409 – 27. 
To my knowledge, the M ā dhyamika philosopher Candrak ī rti (c. 600–650) and the 
Hindu Vedantic philosopher  Ś a ṅ kara (c. 788–820) have both employed the notion 
of superimposition to show how we can use words to refer to the ineff able. However, 
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 20 Rau,  Bhart ṛ haris V ā kyapad ī ya , p. 120:  “ na ca v ā cakar ū pe ṇ a prav ṛ ttasy ā sti v ā cyat ā , 
pratip ā dya ṁ na tat tatra yen ā nyat pratipadyate . ” Before this verse, Bhart ṛ hari states 
that if someone claims that  “ all what I say is false, ” the person does not intend to take 
this claim to be false. Th at Bhart ṛ hari mentions such examples may indicate that our 
aforesaid strategy is a reconstruction rather than an interpretation of his proposed 
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 21 If, however, the word  “ unspeakable ” refers solely to fi rst-order words, not to X, then 
the problem would be similar to the one faced by Kuiji ’ s  apoha solution. 
 22 See  Dacheng qishen lun yiji ( 大 乘 起 信 論 義 記 ),  T 44: 252c11–253a2. 
 23 Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfi eld, and Graham Priest,  “ Th e Way of the Dialetheist: 
Contradictions in Buddhism, ”  Philosophy East and West 58, no. 3 (2008), pp. 399 – 401. 
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 24 For Sengzhao ’ s position on the issue, see: C. Ho,  “ Emptiness as Subject-Object Unity: 
Sengzhao on the Way Th ings Truly Are, ” in  Nothingness in Asian Philosophy , ed. 
JeeLoo Liu and Douglas L. Berger (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 104 – 18. 
 25 Alston,  “ Ineff ability, ” pp. 511 – 17. 
 26 In the  Vimalak ī rtinirde ś a S ū tra , when asked about his own way of transcending 
duality, unlike other Bodhisattvas around who spoke their views, Vimalak ī rti, the 
main character of the sutra, wisely remained silent. He was then praised for his  sacred 
silence . Commenting on this narrative, Jizang remarks that while other Bodhisattvas 
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